Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway — 2005
Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter 2 Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of with Dividends Relative Berkshire Included Results Year (1) (2) (1)-(2) 1965 .................................................. 23.8 10.0 13.8 1966 .................................................. 20.3 (11.7) 32.0 1967 .................................................. 11.0 30.9 (19.9) 1968 .................................................. 19.0 11.0 8.0 1969 .................................................. 16.2 (8.4) 24.6 1970 .................................................. 12.0 3.9 8.1 1971 .................................................. 16.4 14.6 1.8 1972 .................................................. 21.7 18.9 2.8 1973 .................................................. 4.7 (14.8) 19.5 1974 .................................................. 5.5 (26.4) 31.9 1975 .................................................. 21.9 37.2 (15.3) 1976 .................................................. 59.3 23.6 35.7 1977 .................................................. 31.9 (7.4) 39.3 1978 .................................................. 24.0 6.4 17.6 1979 .................................................. 35.7 18.2 17.5 1980 .................................................. 19.3 32.3 (13.0) 1981 .................................................. 31.4 (5.0) 36.4 1982 .................................................. 40.0 21.4 18.6 1983 .................................................. 32.3 22.4 9.9 1984 .................................................. 13.6 6.1 7.5 1985 .................................................. 48.2 31.6 16.6 1986 .................................................. 26.1 18.6 7.5 1987 .................................................. 19.5 5.1 14.4 1988 .................................................. 20.1 16.6 3.5 1989 .................................................. 44.4 31.7 12.7 1990 .................................................. 7.4 (3.1) 10.5 1991 .................................................. 39.6 30.5 9.1 1992 .................................................. 20.3 7.6 12.7 1993 .................................................. 14.3 10.1 4.2 1994 .................................................. 13.9 1.3 12.6 1995 .................................................. 43.1 37.6 5.5 1996 .................................................. 31.8 23.0 8.8 1997 .................................................. 34.1 33.4 .7 1998 .................................................. 48.3 28.6 19.7 1999 .................................................. .5 21.0 (20.5) 2000 .................................................. 6.5 (9.1) 15.6 2001 .................................................. (6.2) (11.9) 5.7 2002 .................................................. 10.0 (22.1) 32.1 2003 .................................................. 21.0 28.7 (7.7) 2004 .................................................. 10.5 10.9 (.4) 2005 .................................................. 6.4 4.9 1.5 Average Annual Gain — 1965-2005 21.5 10.3 11.2 Overall Gain — 1964-2005 305,134 5,583 Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 2005 was $5.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 41 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $59,377, a rate of 21.5% compounded annually.*
Berkshire had a decent year in 2005. We initiated five acquisitions (two of which have yet to close) and most of our operating subsidiaries prospered. Even our insurance business in its entirety did well, though Hurricane Katrina inflicted record losses on both Berkshire and the industry. We estimate our loss from Katrina at $2.5 billion – and her ugly sisters, Rita and Wilma, cost us an additional $.9 billion.
Credit GEICO – and its brilliant CEO, Tony Nicely – for our stellar insurance results in a disaster- ridden year. One statistic stands out: In just two years, GEICO improved its productivity by 32%. Remarkably, employment fell by 4% even as policy count grew by 26% – and more gains are in store. When we drive unit costs down in such a dramatic manner, we can offer ever-greater value to our customers. The payoff: Last year, GEICO gained market-share, earned commendable profits and strengthened its brand. If you have a new son or grandson in 2006, name him Tony.
My goal in writing this report is to give you the information you need to estimate Berkshire’s intrinsic value. I say “estimate” because calculations of intrinsic value, though all-important, are necessarily imprecise and often seriously wrong. The more uncertain the future of a business, the more possibility there is that the calculation will be wildly off-base. (For an explanation of intrinsic value, see pages 77 – 78.) Here Berkshire has some advantages: a wide variety of relatively-stable earnings streams, combined with great liquidity and minimum debt. These factors mean that Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be more precisely calculated than can the intrinsic value of most companies.
Yet if precision is aided by Berkshire’s financial characteristics, the job of calculating intrinsic value has been made more complex by the mere presence of so many earnings streams. Back in 1965, when we owned only a small textile operation, the task of calculating intrinsic value was a snap. Now we own 68 distinct businesses with widely disparate operating and financial characteristics. This array of unrelated enterprises, coupled with our massive investment holdings, makes it impossible for you to simply examine our consolidated financial statements and arrive at an informed estimate of intrinsic value.
We have attempted to ease this problem by clustering our businesses into four logical groups, each of which we discuss later in this report. In these discussions, we will provide the key figures for both the group and its important components. Of course, the value of Berkshire may be either greater or less than the sum of these four parts. The outcome depends on whether our many units function better or worse by being part of a larger enterprise and whether capital allocation improves or deteriorates when it is under the direction of a holding company. In other words, does Berkshire ownership bring anything to the party, or would our shareholders be better off if they directly owned shares in each of our 68 businesses? These are important questions but ones that you will have to answer for yourself.
Before we look at our individual businesses, however, let’s review two sets of figures that show where we’ve come from and where we are now. The first set is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) we own on a per-share basis. In making this calculation, we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings:
*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30 th that of the A.
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Year
Per-Share Investments*
1965..................................................................... $ 4 1975..................................................................... 159 1985..................................................................... 2,407 1995..................................................................... 21,817 2005..................................................................... $74,129 Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005.................... 28.0% Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005.................... 13.0% *Net of minority interests
In addition to these marketable securities, which with minor exceptions are held in our insurance companies, we own a wide variety of non-insurance businesses. Below, we show the pre-tax earnings (excluding goodwill amortization) of these businesses, again on a per-share basis:
Year
Per-Share Earnings*
1965..................................................................... $ 4 1975..................................................................... 4 1985..................................................................... 52 1995..................................................................... 175 2005..................................................................... $2,441 Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005.................... 17.2% Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005.................... 30.2% *Pre-tax and net of minority interests
When growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years have been selected. If either year was aberrational, any calculation of growth will be distorted. In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can produce a breathtaking, but meaningless, growth rate. In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally good; Berkshire earned more money in that year than it did in all but one of the previous ten.
As you can see from the two tables, the comparative growth rates of Berkshire’s two elements of value have changed in the last decade, a result reflecting our ever-increasing emphasis on business acquisitions. Nevertheless, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to increase the figures in both tables. In this ambition, we hope – metaphorically – to avoid the fate of the elderly couple who had been romantically challenged for some time. As they finished dinner on their 50 th
anniversary, however, the wife – stimulated by soft music, wine and candlelight – felt a long-absent tickle and demurely suggested to her husband that they go upstairs and make love. He agonized for a moment and then replied, “I can do one or the other, but not both.”
Acquisitions
Over the years, our current businesses, in aggregate, should deliver modest growth in operating earnings. But they will not in themselves produce truly satisfactory gains. We will need major acquisitions to get that job done.
In this quest, 2005 was encouraging. We agreed to five purchases: two that were completed last year, one that closed after yearend and two others that we expect to close soon. None of the deals involve the issuance of Berkshire shares. That’s a crucial, but often ignored, point: When a management proudly acquires another company for stock, the shareholders of the acquirer are concurrently selling part of their interest in everything they own. I’ve made this kind of deal a few times myself – and, on balance, my actions have cost you money.
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Here are last year’s purchases:
• On June 30 we bought Medical Protective Company (“MedPro”), a 106-year-old medical malpractice insurer based in Fort Wayne. Malpractice insurance is tough to underwrite and has proved to be a graveyard for many insurers. MedPro nevertheless should do well. It will have the attitudinal advantage that all Berkshire insurers share, wherein underwriting discipline trumps all other goals. Additionally, as part of Berkshire, MedPro has financial strength far exceeding that of its competitors, a quality assuring doctors that long-to-settle claims will not end up back on their doorstep because their insurer failed. Finally, the company has a smart and energetic CEO, Tim Kenesey, who instinctively thinks like a Berkshire manager.
• Forest River, our second acquisition, closed on August 31. A couple of months earlier, on June 21, I received a two-page fax telling me – point by point – why Forest River met the acquisition criteria we set forth on page 25 of this report. I had not before heard of the company, a recreational vehicle manufacturer with $1.6 billion of sales, nor of Pete Liegl, its owner and manager. But the fax made sense, and I immediately asked for more figures. These came the next morning, and that afternoon I made Pete an offer. On June 28, we shook hands on a deal.
Pete is a remarkable entrepreneur. Some years back, he sold his business, then far smaller than today, to an LBO operator who promptly began telling him how to run the place. Before long, Pete left, and the business soon sunk into bankruptcy. Pete then repurchased it. You can be sure that I won’t be telling Pete how to manage his operation.
Forest River has 60 plants, 5,400 employees and has consistently gained share in the RV business, while also expanding into other areas such as boats. Pete is 61 – and definitely in an acceleration mode. Read the piece from RV Business that accompanies this report, and you’ll see why Pete and Berkshire are made for each other.
• On November 12, 2005, an article ran in The Wall Street Journal dealing with Berkshire’s unusual acquisition and managerial practices. In it Pete declared, “It was easier to sell my business than to renew my driver’s license.”
In New York, Cathy Baron Tamraz read the article, and it struck a chord. On November 21, she sent me a letter that began, “As president of Business Wire, I’d like to introduce you to my company, as I believe it fits the profile of Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary companies as detailed in a recent Wall Street Journal article.”
By the time I finished Cathy’s two-page letter, I felt Business Wire and Berkshire were a fit. I particularly liked her penultimate paragraph: “We run a tight ship and keep unnecessary spending under wraps. No secretaries or management layers here. Yet we’ll invest big dollars to gain a technological advantage and move the business forward.”
I promptly gave Cathy a cal